

The Logic of External Reform Resistance

Attitudes toward Economic and Political Liberalization in Senegal

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ABSTRACT

Thanks in large part to survey efforts such as the Afrobarometer, scholars have developed and tested a variety of theoretical models explaining why citizens in sub-Saharan Africa hold supportive or, conversely, dissatisfied attitudes toward the economic and political reforms of the last several decades. Much of this research highlights citizens' rational evaluation of the new regimes' performance as the critical component. In this article, we advance an alternative argument, namely that citizens also care about the origins of these political and economic transformations. When citizens view these changes as externally imposed, they are less likely to develop supportive and satisfied attitudes toward the process of economic reform and democracy. Original interview data from Dakar, Senegal strongly supports our argument. The findings have important implications for a continent where economic and political institutions have long been shaped by outside actors.

Keywords: public opinion, democracy, economic reform, Africa, Senegal

Recent development of nationally representative surveys covering nearly every region in the developing world has provided researchers an invaluable source of public opinion data with which to evaluate various theoretical models explaining mass publics' support and satisfaction for economic and political reforms.¹ Across many regions – encompassing wide varieties of institutional legacies, levels of development, and historical experiences – scholars have found consistent support for a theoretical argument emphasizing the capacity of citizens to learn about the reform process and base their attitudes on rational evaluations of the performance

of these new regimes (e.g., Evans & Whitefield, 1995; Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1998; Shin, 1999). This focus on learning and performance evaluations as the key determinant of citizen support is echoed in the sub-Saharan African context (Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes & Bratton, 2007; Fails, 2009).

For observers of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, these theoretical arguments suggest that citizens should be more supportive of their political regimes than the economic adjustment process. While Africa's liberalizing political systems often fall far short of full-fledged liberal democracies (e.g., Levitsky & Way, 2010, Chapter 6), over the past two decades much of the continent has become freer, with enhanced political rights and liberties, more competitive elections, and more frequent turnover of elected leaders (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Lindberg, 2006). Such changes are indeed reflected in attitudes toward democracy among Afrobarometer respondents; a large majority of respondents express support for the principle of democracy and reject common authoritarian alternatives (Bratton et al., 2005, pp. 72–81).

By contrast, citizens' rational performance evaluations of the economic adjustment process should be less favorable, as structural adjustment reforms have consistently failed to live up to their transformative expectations for African economies. At the industry level, adjustment policies have been unable to spark growth in African manufacturing (Lawrence, 2005). At the individual level, they have diminished purchasing power, reduced access to healthcare and education, and increased inequality, poverty, hunger, and child mortality (Shandra, Shandra, & London, 2011; Stein, 2011; Thiessen, 2002). Advocates of structural adjustment claim a few notable success stories – Ghana and Uganda among them – though these cases seem to be the exception to the rule and liberalized reform models continue unabated across the continent (Mosley & Chiripanhura, 2009). This performance is also reflected in the survey data, where citizen attitudes toward economic liberalization are mixed, with general knowledge of structural adjustment remaining low and key pillars of economic reform including privatization and civil-service retrenchment opposed by large majorities (Bratton et al., 2005, Chapter 4).

Performance evaluations undoubtedly play an important role in the formation of citizen support attitudes. Moreover, citizens' abilities to distance themselves from cultural, social, or institutional legacies that might be incompatible with reform and instead judge new regimes on their merits provide some optimism for democratic consolidation

(Diamond, 1999; Rose & Shin, 2001). However, we argue that this focus obscures additional sources of citizen support – or in many cases, the absence of citizen support – for major economic and political transformations in their societies. In particular, we argue that citizens also care about the origins of these institutional changes, and that when citizens view them as externally imposed, they are less likely to develop supportive and satisfied attitudes.

In the sections that follow, we draw on a variety of existing theoretical arguments, including those emphasizing the role of socialization and perceptions of national sovereignty to develop our argument in more detail. We then evaluate the main hypotheses using originally collected interview data from Dakar, Senegal. Analysis of the interview responses provides important support for our general model. We conclude by highlighting the implications our work holds for future research on economic and political reforms in Africa.

The Logic of External Reform Resistance

In sharp contrast to performance evaluation theories, we argue that citizens also base their attitudes toward important economic and political changes on the way in which these reforms came about. More specifically, we argue that citizens who view economic and political reforms as externally imposed, as opposed to emerging as the result of a purely domestic process, are less likely to offer favorable attitudes and evaluations toward these changes. We refer to this as the “Logic of External Reform Resistance.” Importantly, this argument suggests that some proportion of democratic legitimacy attitudes and support for the economic reform process – the twin pillars of Africa’s dual transition over recent decades – may be shaped directly by this process; if citizens view the recent waves of liberalization in their countries as imposed by outside actors, they will be less likely to hold supportive legitimacy attitudes.

Scholars of structural adjustment in Africa – and especially those focusing on the often negative economic, political, and social consequences (e.g., Harvey, 2007; Kim, Millen, Irwin, & Gershman, 2000) – have long recognized the role outside actors including Western countries and Western-dominated financial institutions play in the transformation of African economies. A series of economic shocks, starting with the oil crises in the 1970s and culminating in the 1980s with the stagnation of global trade, decline in commodity prices, and ballooning debt crises ensured

that virtually every sub-Saharan African nation was left with little choice but to engage in structural reform of their economies, under the auspices of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Jespersen, 1992, pp. 11–13).

While Africa's political liberalization has been less formally tied to a series of Western-backed rescue packages, these reforms also reflect the desires of powerful external actors. The emergence of "good governance" as a central pillar of World Bank-sponsored adjustment policies (Jeffries, 1993), the post-Cold War tying of foreign aid to political reform (Carothers, 1999; Dunning, 2004), and the general economic and inter-governmental linkages between nations (Levitsky & Way, 2010, p. 43) all attest to the role external actors have played in furthering political liberalization across Africa. The externally imposed character of such reforms has seldom been tied to individual attitudes toward reform, much less the emergence of democratic legitimacy values and the associated consequences for regime stabilization and consolidation. Nevertheless, we contend that this argument is rooted in several major traditions in the cultural democratization literature.

First, this argument is compatible with classic statements on the role of socialization for the development of political support. As far back as David Easton's formative work, scholars have characterized the kinds of democratic legitimacy attitudes we are studying here as a manifestation of "diffuse" political support, that is, attitudes citizens have toward "what an object is or represents ... not of what it does" (Easton, 1975, p. 444). Of particular importance is the argument that diffuse support represents deep-seated values that are rooted in socialization patterns established early in life (Almond & Verba, 1963; Easton, 1975).

Externally imposed economic and political changes subvert the normal process of socialization that leads to widespread diffuse support values. Particularly for the generation that came of age before these changes, rapid alterations to the core institutional features of political life deny citizens the slow buildup of legitimacy attitudes that stem from early-life socialization. While adult re-learning is possible (a point we return to later), the absence of socialization opportunities suggests that citizens should be less likely to offer positive evaluations and attitudes toward externally imposed institutional changes.

A second approach to the study of cultural democratization also suggests that citizens will be less likely to develop favorable attachments to institutional changes that have been externally imposed. The congruence thesis proposes that there is an important and reciprocal relationship

between citizens' demands for democratic institutions and the extent to which democracy deepens; the more citizens demand democracy in their societies, the more the supply of democracy increases (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). For optimists, this suggests a virtuous cycle between citizens' demands for more democracy and the regimes' subsequent provision. However, this reciprocal component also suggests that externally imposed institutional changes will be evaluated less favorably. Political and economic changes that are externally imposed circumvent this dynamic process by which key institutional features emerge as the result of this back and forth evolution. Externally imposed institutional changes, by definition, did not emerge as the end result of growing citizen demand, and therefore should be characterized by less positive evaluations.

A third approach to the study of public opinion formation, which emphasizes the role of cognitive engagement and awareness about politics, also provides theoretical support for our emphasis on the role of reform origins. Cognitively engaged citizens are widely viewed as more likely to engage in discussions about political and economic events, have greater knowledge and more specific preferences across a wide variety of public affairs issues, and through this deliberative process are more likely to arrive at stable and rational evaluations of policy issues. In the realm of attitudes toward economic reform, existing work has shown that education has a strong negative effect on citizens' satisfaction with economic adjustment, a finding interpreted as evidence that greater awareness about economic reform makes the failures of the adjustment process more noticeable and shapes citizens evaluations thereof (Bratton et al., 2005, Chapter 8).

From our perspective, cognitive awareness should play a particularly large role in citizen evaluations of externally imposed political and economic changes. Cognitively engaged citizens express greater knowledge and more specific preferences across a wide array of public affairs issues (Rose et al., 1998; Shin, 1999). We hypothesize that one such issue is the important role of national sovereignty: more educated and aware citizens should not only recognize the concept of national sovereignty when it comes to domestic politics and the economy, but they should place a greater emphasis on its maintenance. Since the conditionality demands of structural adjustment severely curtail the sovereignty of national governments, we expect that these citizens are therefore more likely to oppose the process of reform. That is, more aware and engaged citizens are more likely to recognize that the process of economic reform, in addition to

economic costs, has important political costs in terms of lost sovereignty for the country. Because these political costs are at least as important as the economic costs for such citizens, recognizing the external imposition of economic reform should be associated with greater citizen dissatisfaction.

To our knowledge, this is a novel argument in the existing literature. Nevertheless, there are several areas of related research that provide important evidence for such a claim. First, greater cognitive engagement has been routinely linked to citizens developing more critical attitudes generally. The traditional approach has treated these “critical citizens” (Norris, 2011) as capable of making broader and more critical – yet simultaneously more sophisticated – distinctions when it comes to their attitudes toward political reform. Applying this idea to our argument, we suggest that cognitively engaged citizens are more likely to recognize a wider array of costs to the reform process, including the loss of national sovereignty. For instance, even if citizens accept the necessity and short-term costs of adjustment in their economies, they may remain opposed to the external imposition of these policy changes that eliminate national sovereignty. Equally, citizens who view the system of democracy in a positive light may reject external political liberalization reforms because they subvert national sovereignty.

Second, this argument is compatible with studies of mass public attitudes in other contexts where major institutional changes have limited national sovereignty. For instance, scholars focusing on European Union (EU) citizens’ attitudes toward further integration have demonstrated that citizens with greater cognitive awareness are more dissatisfied with the EU’s performance and core institutions, a finding the authors interpret as reflecting citizens’ concerns regarding the accountability of the EU (Karp, Banducci, & Bowler, 2003). While the European integration project differs considerably from the era of structural adjustment reform and political liberalization in Africa, they are similar to the extent that fundamental political and economic transformations limited national sovereignty. This too suggests that cognitively engaged citizens are more likely to recognize when important political and economic changes in their country were externally imposed and consequently view such changes less favorably.

In summary, our argument suggests that citizens may develop unsupportive attitudes toward important political and economic changes in their country for reasons unrelated to the actual performance of these new

institutions. Specifically, citizens may be skeptical of these institutions because they were externally imposed, rather than emerging as the result of domestic political processes. Importantly, our theoretical argument is general enough to account for the development of attitudes about both pillars of Africa's recent dual transition to liberal economies and more democratic political systems.

Evaluating the Argument in Senegal

Motivating the Case Selection

Standard sources of survey data, including the Afrobarometer, lack questions that measure the underlying concepts in our argument, such as perceptions on the origins of economic and political liberalization. Therefore, we subject our argument to an empirical test using recently collected interview data from Senegal. Given developments in Senegalese politics over recent decades, this case makes an ideal setting for evaluating our argument.

First, Senegal stands out from many of its West African neighbors – and much of the rest of the continent – in terms of the country's legacy of relatively open and democratic politics. Indeed, as much of the continent was consolidating into one-party, personalistic, or neo-patrimonial regimes in the 1970s and 1980s (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Jackson & Rosberg, 1984), Senegal engaged in a period of constitutional reform allowing opposition parties to begin dismantling the dominance of Senghor's ruling Parti Socialiste (Delgado & Jammeh, 1991; Villalón & Kane, 1998, p. 146), eventually resulting in the popular election of Abdoulaye Wade from the rival Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (Senegalese Democratic Party) in 2000.

Senegal's democracy was put to the test in 2012 as Wade changed the Senegalese Constitution, permitting himself to run for a (previously unconstitutional) third term. The action activated civil society through mass *manifestations* of 20,000 people filling the Place de l'Indépendance near the Presidential Palace in downtown Dakar during the weeks leading up to the elections. The popular slogan and associated movement, “*Y'en a marre*” (“We're fed up”), clearly signified a public becoming “active champions of democracy” (Bratton et al., 2005, p. 155), defying a trend of minimal African political involvement. The outcome of this grassroots outpouring was the restoration of Senegal's democratic legacy:

the second run-off election held in March 2012 elected Macky Sall as the new president by a wide majority.

Beyond the experience with democratic politics, testing our theory also requires that the selected case has a legacy of economic reform through structural adjustment. This too characterizes Senegal; in response to a growing debt crisis, the country received its first structural adjustment program (SAP) loan – and indeed, the continent’s first – from the World Bank in 1979 (van de Walle, 2001). More adjustment programs were implemented in Senegal throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, including 15 additional stabilization and adjustment loans in the 1980s alone (van de Walle, 2001, p. 2), with policies including the devaluation of the CFA franc currency, allowing foreign imports of basic foodstuffs, cutting public expenditure, and privatizing numerous public enterprises, among other reforms (Thiessen, 2002, p. 41). Though the traditional approach to structural adjustment gave way to a new strategy of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in the early 2000s, Senegal’s economy has remained in perpetual “adjustment” for well over three decades (Ali, 2003).

Testing the Argument with Interview Data

We now turn to original interview data conducted in Dakar in Spring 2012 to evaluate citizens’ attitudes toward political and economic reforms. Detailed information on the construction of the interview sample, basic descriptions of the interview process and general questions, as well as demographic characteristics about the respondents is available in the Appendix to this article. It must be noted that the respondents are all highly educated long-term residents of the capital Dakar. While these interviewees certainly are not representative of all citizens of Senegal, this sample is conducive to testing our hypothesis. Urban and educated citizens are usually those who are more cognitively engaged members of society (Bratton et al., 2005). As our theory predicts that citizens who are cognitively engaged are most likely to demonstrate the principled opposition to external reform, selecting urban and educated respondents controls for the possibility of biased results due to underlying differences among citizens. In the paragraphs that follow, we focus on uncovering the linkages interview respondents’ make between the origins of economic and political reforms, respectively, and their attitudes toward these institutional changes.

Economic Attitudes – External Origins and Support for Reform

As predicted by the broad patterns uncovered by systematic survey analysis using the Afrobarometer (Bratton et al., 2005), our interview respondents were quite vocal on the negative effects of structural adjustment, focusing on the extent to which adjustment regimes caused distinct material hardship for citizens. Many commented on the effects of the devaluation of the CFA franc currency: “everything has become much more expensive”;² “the price had been doubled ... [there was] increased unemployment ... the most poor did not have anything to eat.”³ Others noted the effects on the education and health sectors: “There were truly very many students and very little space and teachers”;⁴ “the smashing of health came from SAPs.”⁵ And still others focused on groups of individuals who were affected: “The SAP has had consequences for civil servants”;⁶ “women in particular [were affected].”⁷ These negative experiences with structural adjustment are certainly enough to cause citizens to demonstrate less support of economic reform. However, is it the case that citizens display a more principled opposition to economic reform if they view it as having external origins, exhibiting what we term the Logic of External Reform Resistance? The following responses help us tease out this causal relationship.

A 32-year-old male Project Manager described one negative consequence of structural adjustment that personally affected him: “Since the social services do not have much funding or structural infrastructure, when I was in school I walked 10 kilometers each day to go to primary school. I was obliged to leave my village to do my secondary school.” His discontent with the removal of government education subsidies is reason enough to be unsupportive of structural adjustment; however, his equation of such negative consequences to the origination of the reforms is telling:

When I look at the World Bank and the IMF I always think that these institutions that impose policies are often not good. So I would love that these institutions accompany the government without conditions I think that the West is very influential in Senegal. Because with colonization, we thought that the Westerners who were more advanced than us economically, we thought it was necessary to copy their model The West is developed because they have had programs that undertake their local realities, but these are not ours. We should not transfer models, it is necessary to find another model for our own reality. The influence is not a very good thing.⁸

This respondent clearly demonstrates the Logic of External Reform Resistance. Not only does he cite external imposition as a reason for his principled dissatisfaction with structural adjustment, but he specifically notes that because of the reform's unfamiliarity with the local realities in Senegal there were very negative consequences for citizens, including decreased access to education. This logic was echoed by a female Manager at UNICEF:

[A Structural Adjustment Program is] a strategy to help countries in difficulty get out of poverty. And it is policies imposed by the Western countries I've heard tell that SAPs have been negative for those countries who have submitted to this policy. It has not helped the countries to get out of poverty. This plan should not be imposed on all countries in the same manner ... in fact, one cannot make the same model for every country.⁹

Her comments illustrate this important notion that countries face different histories, different cultures, as well as different economic and political realities. These differences suggest that economic reform models, if they are to be successful, cannot be uniformly imposed on all countries. To her, because structural adjustment has been externally imposed by countries and institutions that do not recognize this idea, the consequences have been very negative.

A 29-year-old female program assistant at a Dakar-based research center clearly reveals the causal connection between external imposition and legitimacy attitudes:

There had been the propositions [SAPs] that the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank had brought, and the Africans had been obliged to sign them to have money. But we suffer now. The debt of Africa, we don't even know how much it is; the most indebted countries can no longer pay. This continues all the time.¹⁰

She too had been personally affected by structural adjustment, citing “a reduction in the hours of class” as a result of decreased government education subsidies. However, the above quotation reveals a deeper principled belief beyond personal material hardships. In her mind, because the West forced economic reform upon Africa – it was an “obligation” for Senegal to sign the loan documents – they now suffer a tremendous debt burden. Thus, she views economic reform negatively for the reason that it was externally imposed.

These responses provide important evidence that citizens recognize how externally imposed reforms subvert the sovereignty of African governments over their own economy. In our argument, more educated and aware citizens should not only recognize the concept of national sovereignty, but they should also place a greater emphasis on its maintenance. This linkage was common throughout the interviews we conducted. An Executive Secretary at a gender and development think-tank explains:

So the relations with the West are things that must be rethought. I think that the fundamental question is the question of sovereignty. It is necessary that people recognize the sovereignty of African states[The World Bank and IMF] threw adjustment politics in Africa by proposing policies of austerity, particularly around the reduction of the state, education, health, and the privatization of certain sectors to lead an economic recovery in Africa. But the result was catastrophic from many points of view.¹¹

She thus demonstrates our Logic of External Reform Resistance: because reforms were imposed by external institutions, they violate domestic sovereignty in Africa; consequently, she is opposed to structural adjustment. Similarly, a professional businessman vividly states his position that because the Western International Financial Institutions continue to mete out economic reforms, they infringe upon African self-determination:

I have very bad images of these institutions [the World Bank and IMF]. They are maintained to ensure that Africa does not develop itself. Instead of giving fish every day, it is necessary to learn how to fish. They give us fish all the time. For me, I am against that. What is necessary is to aid the African on how to act so that we can make ourselves autonomous.¹²

Referencing the common adage, this businessman argues that Africa is capable of learning how to develop, yet structural adjustment has prevented Africa from realizing its potential. A female Senegalese researcher and professor in the midst of finishing her PhD developed this perspective further:

It is the reforms that come from the World Bank and developed countries ... but that have been produced by the outside ... The relation that we have with the West must be rethought; the relationship is not fair. Because a consequence

of the SAP is that we are forever tied with the West and with the World Bank and the IMF. If we wish to leave, it is necessary to have development.¹³

She notes other material consequences of structural adjustment (“degraded access to good education, to health, many people are excluded because they don’t have the means”), but more importantly, she sees that the external imposition of economic reform has caused a dependence which subverts African sovereignty. This is the factor that contributes to her negative attitude toward structural adjustment as well as the general relationship with the West. This response is echoed by a 33-year-old female journalist:

For me, SAPs are just politics imposed by rich countries, in this case, the West, to control and dominate poor countries. SAPs are the strategies of the Northern governments and the multilateral financial institutions to promote inequalities.¹⁴

These viewpoints, while representing the majority of interview respondents, were not held universally in our sample. One respondent was unfamiliar with the concept of structural adjustment, and thus could not provide an answer regarding the role of external actors in the reform process.¹⁵ An additional three respondents did not recognize economic reforms as being externally imposed, and thus provide an important comparison group for our main hypothesis. If our argument is correct, views on the external origins of reform should shape respondents’ attitudes toward said reform, such that citizens who view economic reform as externally imposed should be less supportive of these changes than those who do not connect economic reform with external imposition. Though only small in number, these comparison group respondents provide important evidence of this relationship.

One gentleman, a 44-year-old jeweler, believed that the purpose of SAPs is “to be developed” and that such plans were “necessary to balance many domains (education, health, good state governance, fight against corruption).”¹⁶ A male architect saw structural adjustment as “solutions to help countries in the path of development.”¹⁷ Finally, a 49-year-old female entrepreneur believed that “Structural adjustment is maybe moves that governments will take to ameliorate the living standards of its citizens. That’s the way I see it. The adjustments that have to be made for people to live better, to have a better quality of life.”¹⁸ Even though this particular individual was personally affected, having lost a piece of land

under structural adjustment, she maintained that overall it was a positive reform and made no mention of external imposition. Most importantly for the sake of evaluating our argument, these citizens who did not recognize the external origins of structural adjustment offered considerably more positive assessments of the economic reform agenda, providing important evidence for our central theoretical claim on the importance of citizens' views on the origins of major institutional changes in their societies.

Political Attitudes – External Origins and Support for Reform

A novel element of our argument is that it can apply to the development of attitudes toward democracy, so long as it is reasonable to assume that some citizens may view the process of political liberalization as externally imposed. Our interview data also lets us test this second linkage, wherein citizens who view democracy as being externally imposed will demonstrate weaker democratic legitimacy attitudes. Since, compared to structural adjustment, democracy has less visibly originated elsewhere, the results are especially fascinating.

Similar to the above responses on economic reform, several respondents focused on how external political reform cannot account for local realities, and consequently, adjusted their attitude toward this reform. A manager at UNICEF believes that democracy has not truly originated domestically: "It is true that we still do not know what democracy really is Above all, the design of democracy [should] emanate from the people, that it comes from the people, not imposed by the Westerners. The people wish a change in Senegal, a democracy, they know their needs."¹⁹ She explicitly recognizes that external imposition of democracy cannot truly take local realities into account. While she supports the system of democracy as a "way of guiding a country," she has qualified her support because of external imposition.

Another respondent recounts:

"Towards the 1950s it was the Europeans who had spoken to us of [democracy]. We had had our own democracy ... I think that we had left to the side our own way of democracy and political governance. We have tried to imitate the external democracy in Africa. But there are realities that remain. It is not a good solution."²⁰

A 58-year-old university professor and director at a research center echoes the above idea by pointing out the irony of external imposition of democracy:

It is the people that know the reality and know what they need. In these conditions, one can never be in offices and decide what is good for Senegal from outside of Senegal. It is necessary to discuss with the Senegalese to see what is good for the Senegalese people. It is necessary in the relations between developing countries and the rest of the powerful world ... to have much more dialogue, a little bit so that there is more democracy.²¹

This professor directly views the external imposition of democracy as negative because outsiders cannot understand the situation of Africans and thus should not make decisions for them. Critically, his identification of the external origins of democracy in Senegal renders him more skeptical about the very idea of democracy as a political system: “It is necessary to pay attention. A nation is not a village. Senegal is not a village. In a village you can organize and discuss, but in a nation there are millions of inhabitants. Democracy cannot be perfect The democratic system is the ‘least evil’ but not the best.” Consistent with our overall argument, the underlying reason for his very negative attitude toward this political system is that its external origination fails to account for local realities.

Another gentleman, a 40-year-old professional businessman, similarly expressed dissatisfaction with the system of democracy itself. He proclaims succinctly, “Concerning politics, I think that they [the West] imposed on us a democracy that was not what we needed. We needed socialism much more.”²² This is significant that these two respondents exhibited negative attitudes toward the overarching system of democracy in part because of its external origins.

As with economic reform, a number of respondents identified sovereignty – and the limitation thereof – as the core source of their dissatisfaction with the external origins of political liberalization. The Executive Secretary of a gender and development think-tank identifies the question of sovereignty once again: “We realize that democracy has evolved. There are ups and downs. It doesn’t change. It doesn’t change because there are elements that are external to Africa, as I said, the open hand of the West on the internal questions of life.”²³ Her recognition of the Western imposition is not absent an acknowledgment of the failure of many political reforms across the continent: “Unfortunately that creates very unfortunate experiences in Africa. Leaders, elected democratically, once in power are metamorphosized into dictators. So the case in Senegal is interesting because finally the case of Senegal shows that the people are better.” However, while democracy has taken a more favorable trajectory in Senegal, she still defines her requirements of democracy, stating, “It is

necessary that he who is brought to power is the choice emanating from the popular will To make a society where the poor have more equality with the rich, to share resources properly, and the political justice to make a way where everyone participates in the decision of democratic governance.” Despite Africa’s failed experiences with political reform, her qualified support of democracy is more attributed to a focus on popular will and participation, rather than on unsuccessful reform. This connects back to her explanation on the external elements of democracy in Africa: democracy should be maintained by the citizens, not outsiders.

With a touch of irony, a female journalist points out:

The West has power over the functionality of our States, so that we are always at the colonial era but under another form. African countries are not yet independent ... For me democracy is a political regime in which power belongs to the people. At the same time, I think that it is a political ideology that sometimes distorts its true sense. The criticism in the majority of so-called democratic states is that the power does not belong to the people.²⁴

Referencing Africa’s long history with colonialism, she discerns Western attempts to encroach upon Africa’s sovereignty with political reform as neo-colonial. While she upholds the principle of democracy, she critically distinguishes the difference between principles and reality in democracies. Equating her qualified support of democracy with her understanding that the West is imposing democratic reform on Africa, this respondent is demonstrating our Logic of External Reform Resistance.

A female professor and researcher is more subtle: “We talk a lot about democracy in Senegal, even if many don’t know what it is.”²⁵ This hints at external origination of political reform, in that democracy is a foreign concept. She then emphasizes one aspect of democracy, where the citizen and civil society play “the role of awakening and alert to preserve this question of democracy.” Her focus on a bottom-up implementation of democracy reflects her recognition that democracy has external origins – she desires a grassroots reform, not an external one.

The causal nature of argument can, once again, be assessed by examining the responses of subjects who did not view Senegal’s political liberalization as externally imposed. Our argument suggests that these citizens should be more likely to display prominent democratic legitimacy attitudes, including support for the system of democracy, than their counterparts described earlier, all else equal. Again, the sample size is small but the responses of two female subjects are illustrative. One female

respondent views democracy solely as the outcome of political reform in Senegal, rather than resulting from external forces. Consequently, her attitudes toward democracy are supportive: “We have hopes that it [democracy] will work well. Truly, there is a reform, not just texts or laws, but we practice [democracy].”²⁶ Another woman offers a definition and implied support for democracy utterly devoid of any connections to external imposition; for her, democracy is “the possibility for a people to be able to exercise a permanent control over its leaders,”²⁷ demonstrating that democracy to her is a very internal process between citizens and governments. In this case, both respondents view democracy as an internal evolutionary process, as opposed to a set of reforms imposed from outside Senegal, and as predicted display noticeably more supportive attitudes toward democracy as a political system.

Finally, we discuss a few respondents whose attitudes and linkages provide important exceptions to the general empirical patterns we have described earlier. In particular, a few respondents readily accept the external origins of political liberalization in Senegal, yet these views do not diminish their support for the principle of democratic governance. One gentleman recognized some Western imposition of reform: “The governments of the third world, because they always stretch their hand towards the West, they need to accept all that the West proposes – even the bad things.”²⁸ While some of these Western proposals have included political reform, this respondent maintains a strong support of democracy, believing it to be “a universal rule. It began with the Greeks centuries ago ... It is a very good thing, it allows everyone to speak.” Despite recognizing Western imposition, his attitude toward democracy remains positive.

A female program assistant further elaborates this mindset: “We have very much adapted democracy ... It is a little difficult for Africans to develop themselves like the West, or even adapt exactly their way of doing, their way of directing structures.”²⁹ Despite realizing that a Western democracy is not the best solution for African development, she maintains a strong support of the system of democracy: “It is necessary that there is a democracy for the people to express themselves and their opinion without constraints.”

How can we make sense of these contradictions? Some of the differences may be attributable to the abstract nature of our key independent variable, namely the perception of external involvement in key economic and political reforms. Some citizens may adopt a broader view of external influence, and these decisions may affect the extent to which

their identification of such influence shapes their support for the reform process. Indeed, the responses from one female entrepreneur are suggestive of this linkage. Analysis of her interview responses suggests that she readily views democracy as originating in the West, yet remains committed to democracy as a system of government. "I have two views about Western influence. When it comes to things that I think are positive like technology, when it comes to democracy, when it comes to industrialization as examples, Western civilization is something that can be positive for us."³⁰ She goes on, however, to highlight areas of Western influence in which she disapproves, including differing social values, citing attitudes toward homosexuality as a specific example. The respondent's acknowledgment of external influence in the political liberalization process has not dampened her enthusiasm for democracy: "I think people welcome democratic values because they know it is the best choice that we have right now." Examining citizens' views on the external origins of additional factors – including cultural changes and value shifts – may prove useful for understanding mass attitudes for a set of developments beyond economic and political liberalization.

Overall, our analysis of the survey data provides supportive evidence for our general argument hypothesizing that citizens who perceive major institutional transformations of their societies as externally imposed will be less supportive of these reform efforts. The reasons are varied – many see external imposition as diminishing African sovereignty over their political system, some see the irony of *imposing* democracy, and several point out that external origins fail to take account of local realities. Thus, our interview data has provided us ample evidence to support our claim that those who view political reform as being externally imposed or having external origins will be less likely to display strong democratic legitimacy attitudes.

Implications for Future Research

The study of mass attitudes regarding fundamental political and economic transformations throughout Africa and much of the rest of the developing world has been immensely aided by the development of large-scale representative surveys. Careful analysis of this rich data source has provided scholars with optimistic assessments about the likelihood of, among other outcomes, the consolidation of democratic and economic reforms. As citizens learn to judge regimes based on rational evaluations of their performance, they can further develop deep-seated attachments

to democracy as a system of governance. While we recognize the role that performance evaluations can play, we offer an alternative argument that emphasizes the origins of these institutional changes, both political and economic. As we have argued theoretically and demonstrated with original interview data, citizens who believe that these changes were externally imposed are less likely to develop supportive and satisfied attitudes toward these transformations.

Overall, these findings have a variety of important implications for future research. First and foremost, they provide important detail on determinants of key attitudes in a transitioning country in the region. Given the important role of mass support for democracy in the consolidation process, it is critical to have as complete of an account as possible regarding how such attitudes form. Second, our results suggest that the dominant theory of attitude formation, which emphasizes learning and performance evaluations, should be expanded. Citizens undoubtedly care about whether their new regimes deliver the political goods, yet our findings suggest that they also care about the origins of these institutions and what their adoption suggests about the role of outside influences in shaping domestic political institutions. Though our small sample prevents us from making country or continent-wide conclusions, it does suggest that measuring mass publics' beliefs on the origins of these changes is an important avenue for future survey research. For a continent where economic and political institutions have long been shaped by outside parties, these are important findings.

Appendix A

Conditions of Interviews

Fifteen interviews were conducted in Dakar, Senegal by Dana M. Parke between April and June, 2012. Interviews were conducted in French or English, depending on the respondent's preferences; all interviews conducted in French have been translated into English by the author. During the interview, the author typed the responses as the respondent answered. The respondents were assured of their anonymity: that their names would not be credited to their comments, nor used in any part of the research. Respondents were identified using a "snowball" method of research, where respondents suggested possible future participants for the interview.

List of Interview Questions

1. Are you familiar with Structural Adjustment Programs?
2. Can you define what a Structural Adjustment Program is in your own words?
3. Have you been personally affected by Structural Adjustment Programs? If so, how?
4. How do you feel about Western influence in your country?
5. How would you define democracy?
6. What are the current attitudes and preferences regarding political reform and democracy?
7. [If applicable] Has your negative/positive experience with Structural Adjustment Programs influenced your attitude toward democracy and other Western institutions?
8. What is your level of education? Your gender? Your age? Your occupation? Your country of origin?

Appendix B

Demographic Information of Respondents

	Gender	Age	Occupation	Level of Education	Country of Origin
Interview 1	Male	44	Jeweler	High School	Togo
Interview 2	Female	35	Director at UNICEF	Masters	Benin
Interview 3	Female	29	Program Assistant	PhD	Senegal
Interview 4	Female	27	Program Assistant	Masters	Senegal
Interview 5	Female	29	Professor/Researcher	PhD	Senegal
Interview 6	Female	31	Head of Relations and Programs	Masters	Senegal
Interview 7	Male	32	Project Manager	Masters	Senegal
Interview 8	Male	50	Language Professor	Bachelor's Degree	Senegal
Interview 9	Female	43	Executive Secretary of a gender and development think-tank	Masters	Senegal
Interview 10	Male	58	Director of a research center/Professor at UCAD	PhD	Senegal
Interview 11	Female	49	Entrepreneur	Bachelor's Degree	Sierra Leone
Interview 12	Male	40	Professional Businessman	Bachelor's Degree	Senegal

(Appendix B continued)

(Appendix B continued)

	Gender	Age	Occupation	Level of Education	Country of Origin
Interview 13	Male	32	Architect	Architectural License	Cameroon
Interview 14	Female	33	Journalist	Masters	Senegal
Interview 15	Female	55	Administrative assistant	Bachelor's Degree	Senegal

Note: Despite country of origin, all respondents were current and long-time residents of Dakar, Senegal at the time the interviews were conducted.

Abbreviations: UCAD = Université Cheikh Anta Diop, UNICEF = United Nations Children’s Fund.

NOTES

1. See for instance, Rose et al. (1998) for the New Democracies Barometer in post-Communist Europe, Shin (1999) for the Korea Barometer, Inoguchi (2009) for the Asian Barometer Survey, and Lagos (2001) for the Latinobarometer. A useful review of the comparative barometer projects can be found in the individual essays in Lindberg and Smith (2012) and in Fails and Pierce (2010).
2. Interview 6; April 26, 2012.
3. Interview 8; May 2, 2012.
4. Interview 10; May 9, 2012.
5. Interview 7; April 30, 2012.
6. Interview 3; April 25, 2012.
7. Interview 15; June 25, 2012.
8. Interview 7; April 30, 2012.
9. Interview 2; April 21, 2012.
10. Interview 3; April 25, 2012.
11. Interview 9; May 3, 2012.
12. Interview 12; May 11, 2012.
13. Interview 5; April 25, 2012.
14. Interview 14, June 25, 2012.
15. Interview 4; April 25, 2012.
16. Interview 1; April 20, 2012.
17. Interview 13; May 13, 2012.
18. Interview 11; May 10, 2012.
19. Interview 2; April 21, 2012.
20. Interview 3; April 25, 2012.
21. Interview 10; May 9, 2012.
22. Interview 12; May 11, 2012.

23. Interview 9; May 3, 2012.
24. Interview 14; June 25, 2012.
25. Interview 5; April 25, 2012.
26. Interview 6; April 26, 2012.
27. Interview 15; June 25, 2012.
28. Interview 1; April 20, 2012.
29. Interview 4; April 25, 2012.
30. Interview 11; May 10, 2012.

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