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Does substantive democratization create more committed democrats? Surprising evidence from Africa

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A growing body of evidence holds that citizens support democracy when they believe the regime has provided individual freedoms and political rights. Put simply, citizens develop legitimacy attitudes by learning about democracy. These findings, however, are based on citizens' evaluations of the procedural elements of democracy. Democratization also entails substantive reforms that likely impact legitimacy attitudes. This article provides the first test of how the success – and failure – of substantive democratization shapes legitimacy attitudes. Using data from the second round of Afrobarometer surveys, I find surprising results. Citizens who judge the regime to be more successful in substantive democratization are actually *less* likely to be committed democrats. I conclude with possible explanations of these surprising findings and reflect on the challenges for both future research and for the new democracies facing this situation.

Keywords: democracy; democratization; citizens; political rights; Africa; Afrobarometer

For new democracies to function, citizens must support the principle of democracy and reject authoritarian alternatives. An increase in these mass attitudes signals that democracy has become 'the only game in town' and reduces the likelihood of a democratic reversal.¹ A growing body of evidence from new democracies holds that citizens develop these attitudes by evaluating how well the regime performs the various tasks associated with democratic governance.²

However, these conclusions are based on measuring citizens' evaluations of democratic procedures only, such as the occurrence of elections and promotion of individual freedoms. Democratization is a process where the transition to liberal democracy requires similarly fundamental substantive reforms, including enhancing the regime's responsiveness, accountability, and promotion of the rule of law. Do citizens in new democracies use substantive criteria to evaluate the

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extent of democracy in their country? And if so, do positive evaluations of substantive democratization create more committed democrats? Despite the implications for democratization research programmes in various cultures, these questions have not been previously analysed.

This article uses survey data from democratizing regimes in sub-Saharan Africa to answer these questions. The results, however, are surprising. Citizens do indeed define democracy in procedural and substantive terms, but those who judge the regime to be more successful at substantive democratization are actually *less* likely fully to support democracy and reject authoritarian alternatives. These citizens are significantly less committed to democracy. Mass publics appear willing to sacrifice the principle of democracy for increased promotion of the rule of law and responsiveness from political leaders. This presents a considerable challenge for new regimes, as they must convince their citizens that the institutions of a modern state and democracy are not mutually exclusive.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section Two describes the existing literature's emphasis on political learning models, including the current dismissal of substantive democratization, and outlines the key hypotheses of the article. Section Three describes the data and measures employed in the empirical analysis, including measurement of legitimacy attitudes and citizens' evaluations of substantive democratization. Section Four reports the empirical results. The conclusion explores the surprising findings and discusses several implications regarding the continued study of mass attitudes toward democracy and the democratization process.

Learning about (procedural) democracy

Countless studies have sought to identify the types of mass attitudes most compatible with stable democracy. Of principle importance are attitudes of democratic legitimacy, reflecting citizens' belief that democratic political institutions are the most appropriate way to govern.³ These legitimacy attitudes, often described as citizens' commitment to democracy, are assessed by probing the depth of citizens' support for democracy as a system of governance and their simultaneous rejection of authoritarian alternatives.⁴ Higher proportions of committed democrats are said to promote various positive outcomes, including regime stabilization and democratic deepening. Even among advanced democracies – often described as having increasing numbers of citizens who distrust politicians, parties, and political institutions – high levels of support for democratic principles are evidence of the continued vitality of the regimes.⁵

The importance of these regime-specific attitudes, combined with the proliferation of cross-national public opinion surveys across democratizing regions, has generated a vast literature analysing the conditions that encourage citizens to commit to democracy. The most recent efforts to explain the existence of such attitudes focus on the role of popular learning. Citizens support democracy and reject authoritarian alternatives because they learn about and carefully evaluate the

performance of the new regime. Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi summarize the role of learning best:

... people establish opinions by checking their own reactions to the concrete consequences of new political ... arrangements. The content and consequences of new regimes leads us to focus on knowledge and experience as the key determinants of public opinion.⁶

The concept of learning is deeply rooted in the study of mass attitudes. Classic works emphasize early-life socialization and the social context in which citizens mature and develop political awareness.⁷ Generational differences are prominent, since 'everyone socialized into a culture is exposed to the same set of values supporting the regime and its basic rules of the game'.⁸ This conception of popular learning suggests that new democracies will not develop a supportive political culture of legitimacy attitudes until older cohorts of citizens – socialized into an authoritarian post-colonial system – are gradually replaced by citizens who came of age during the era of democratic politics.

Citizens also learn about democracy by evaluating the performance of the new regime. Performance-based theories highlight the role of institutional change and citizens' assessments of the new political and economic goods provided. Mishler and Rose, for instance, argue that citizens develop legitimacy attitudes based on their 'contemporary adult experience of what government does'.⁹ These theories of learning offer more optimistic prospects for the development of supportive political cultures; citizens of all generations and social backgrounds can learn to support democracy based on the new regimes' success at providing a variety of political and economic goods.

The most recent contributions describe a 'lifetime learning model', integrating early-life learning and performance-based regime evaluation to explain democratic legitimacy attitudes. Moreover, the relative influence of each component varies depending on the nature of the political transition.¹⁰ In long-standing democracies, socialization and performance evaluations 'may teach fundamentally the same lessons and have indistinguishable effects'.¹¹ For new democracies undergoing rapid and unprecedented political transitions, adult relearning plays a much larger role, since evaluations of the new regime may be in direct contrast to the opinions and attitudes formed during pre-adult socialization under the authoritarian regime.¹²

What aspects of the new regime do citizens evaluate? The overwhelming consensus is that political factors are of principle importance.¹³ Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, for example, argue that whether or not citizens judge the new regime to be more fair and promote individual liberties influences citizens' support for democracy and rejection non-democratic alternatives.¹⁴ Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi demonstrate that commitment to democracy is a function of the regime's ability to deliver political rights such as increased personal freedom and political equality.¹⁵ Most recently, Mattes and Bratton show that citizens

who believe that the new democratic regime has provided individual freedom of speech, association, vote choice, and a sense of political equality are significantly more likely to be committed democrats.¹⁶ While each study focuses on slightly different indicators, they all make the fundamental argument that legitimacy attitudes depend on individuals learning about the elements of democracy and positively evaluating how well their regime performs these tasks.

These diverse studies share another common feature; despite claims of evaluating how citizens learn about democracy, they all focus rather narrowly on citizens' evaluations of procedural democratization. Procedural democratization describes the imposition of political reforms that transform previously authoritarian political systems into those better embodying Schumpeter's ideal of a 'free competition for a free vote'.¹⁷ These prior studies have focused on procedural democratization by highlighting citizens' perceived freedom to vote, freedom to associate with political parties, and senses of political equality. All of these reforms are important elements of democracy and represent notable deviations from the authoritarian regimes of the past. Yet the transformation from authoritarianism to liberal democracy necessitates more than the simple introduction of elections, political parties, and universal suffrage.

Liberal democracies require both procedural *and* substantive democratization.¹⁸ Substantive democratization, in contrast to the procedural elements of democratization, represents 'the empowerment of ordinary citizens and the responsiveness of a political system to their preferences'.¹⁹ It is the set of reforms that ensures citizens' preferences are translated into policies and that their votes and decisions are not spoiled by a set of political institutions that is democratic in name but subject to numerous violations of the rule of law. In many ways, substantive democratization involves reforms that are more critical to democracy. Bratton and Chang, for instance, rightly claim that the rule of law is 'an irreducible component of democracy'.²⁰

The role of substantive democratization is solidly integrated into the theoretical literature. Diamond, for instance, notes how democratization is a developmental phenomenon and that the emergence of liberal democracies depends on the extension and deepening of procedural reforms to include substantive elements like government responsiveness and a strong rule of law.²¹ Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer build this concern with substantive democratization into their definition of liberal democracy. Their four-part definition includes two procedural elements, including whether elections are free and fair with mass suffrage and whether civil society institutions and associations exist independent of government. The other components are substantive, including whether the regime is accountable to the electorate and whether the regime upholds the rule of law.²² Regimes exhibiting all four characteristics are considered liberal democracies.

The survey literature ignores evaluations of substantive democratization as part of the calculus citizens undertake when supporting democracy over authoritarian alternatives. This omission begs several questions. First and foremost is whether or not citizens in transitional regimes view democratization in the same substantive terms as democratic theorists. Or, conversely, do they define their country's level of

democracy solely in terms of procedural elements such as elections, voting, and political parties? Existing research from Africa's transitional regimes shows that citizens attach a variety of meanings to the concept of democracy, including procedural notions such as the existence of elections, civil liberties, and individual freedom, and outcome-based answers such as redressing economic inequality.²³ Yet these findings do not test whether citizens view democratization as a developmental process whose success is marked by the implementation of substantive democratization reforms. This requires assessing whether citizens view their own regime as more democratic in practice if substantive democratization has been more successful.

Extending this logic, if citizens also learn about democracy according to substantive criteria, do these evaluations affect the formation of legitimacy attitudes? And if so, do they work in the same direction as the existing popular learning models suggest, where positive evaluations foster greater commitment to democracy? New regimes' successes – and perhaps more frequent failures²⁴ – with substantive democratization have not been previously used to predict legitimacy attitudes. Neglecting the substantive democratization components in popular learning models has serious consequences for this research programme. Principally, it is impossible to comprehensively argue that legitimacy attitudes arise from learning about democracy when empirical analysis relies on an incomplete conceptualization of the democratization process. Until citizens' evaluations of substantive democratization are integrated into empirical models, we cannot say for certain how learning about democracy shapes legitimacy attitudes.

This article attempts to remedy this shortcoming by using survey data from sub-Saharan Africa to answer each of these research questions. The analysis first tests whether citizens view democracy in substantive and procedural terms, and second, how these evaluations shape democratic legitimacy attitudes. The empirical tests focus on the new democracies of sub-Saharan Africa for two specific reasons. First, Mishler and Rose's lifetime learning theory argues that performance evaluations are a stronger influence on legitimacy attitudes in new democracies. Africa's relatively recent experience with democracy²⁵ makes these regimes a useful testing ground. Given the legacy of authoritarian regimes in the region, we should expect legitimacy attitudes here to be strongly driven by popular learning.

Second, no other region better exemplifies the gulf between procedural and substantive democratization. For example, van de Walle argues that despite the proliferation of competitive elections, 'political freedoms and civil rights ... are imperfectly observed in practice' and that 'certain groups, may, in effect, be above the law'.²⁶ The case study literature also highlights the role of substantive democratization in the region. The relative failure of substantive democratization in Nigeria, for instance, has been linked to increased ethno-religious conflict, a precipitous decline in public attitudes towards democracy, and ultimately the conditions that facilitated overthrows of civilian democratic regimes.²⁷ This considerable gap allows each component of the democratization process to have independent and measurable effects on legitimacy attitudes.

Variables and measurement

To evaluate these research questions, this paper uses data collected from the second round of Afrobarometer surveys. Specifically, the analysis employs the 16-country merged dataset including pooled responses for all countries surveyed in the second round.²⁸ This facilitates cross-country comparisons and ensures that the conclusions derived are not dependent on country-specific results. The text and descriptive statistics of all employed survey items is provided in Appendix A.

Each research question requires a separate dependent variable. Evaluations of the *Extent of Democracy* in their own country are used to test whether citizens view democratization in procedural and substantive terms. *Extent of Democracy* is a categorical variable with four possible responses: the respondent believes the country is not a democracy, a democracy with major problems, a democracy with minor problems, or a full democracy.

To test the effect of substantive and procedural democratization on democratic legitimacy attitudes, this paper uses Mattes and Bratton's construct *Demand for Democracy*. This construct measures a respondent's principled support for democracy as well as their rejection of three prominent non-democratic alternatives: one-man rule, military rule, and one-party rule.²⁹ The four indicators are averaged together to create a measure of a respondent's individual commitment to the democratic process.³⁰ This averaging process results in a variable that is approximately continuous; there are 15 different observed values in this data, where higher values characterize respondents who are more fully supportive of democracy as a system of governance and more fully reject authoritarian alternatives.

As noted above, a principle shortcoming of the existing literature is the failure to include substantive democratization as part of the reforms that citizens might learn about, evaluate, and use to shape their attitudes on the legitimacy of democracy. To correct this oversight, the analysis below measures individuals' perceptions of procedural and substantive democratization. Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer's³¹ four-part definition of liberal democracies, described above, guides these measures.

Their conceptual definition includes the requisite procedural reforms, including contesting free and fair elections and allowing open participation in civil society organizations independent of the regime. These procedural elements are measured by averaging respondents' views on whether freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom to vote, and political equality have all increased under the new regime.³² This variable has been previously described by Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi as the *Delivery of Political Rights*. Higher values of this variable suggest that individuals view procedural democracy as more fully entrenched in the regime.

The measures of substantive democratization must account for the remaining characteristics of liberal democracies in the typology: accountability to the electorate and acceptance, respect, and enforcement of the rule of law. Moreover, the measures must capture the underlying theoretical premise that substantive democratization entails regime accountability and responsiveness and the political

empowerment of mass publics. Substantive democratization is gauged by two separate indicators developed by Bratton and Chang.³³ Specifically, this paper measures citizens' perceived *Enforcement Capacity* and *Responsive Capacity*. Following these authors' variable construction, citizens' perceptions of enforcement capacity are measured with two survey questions asking the respondent to evaluate whether the new government is more or less able to enforce the law and whether safety from crime and violence is better under the present regime. These items are averaged together to create the variable *Enforcement Capacity*, where higher values indicate that the new regime has improved its provision of the rule of law.³⁴

Perceptions of the responsiveness of the regime are measured by questions asking respondents to judge how often elected leaders look after the interests of average citizens and how often they listen to citizen demands. Responses to these items are also averaged to create a respondent's perceived *Responsive Capacity*.³⁵ This variable is similarly scaled so that higher values indicate greater substantive democratization. If substantive democratization affects legitimacy attitudes in the same ways as procedural democratization, each measure should be positively correlated with *Demand for Democracy*.

The models also contain a battery of control variables including respondents' cognitive awareness, social structure, cultural values, and institutional influences. Cognitive awareness variables include *See Democracy as Procedures*, which measures a general tendency of respondents to accept the legitimacy of elections as the key procedural element of democracy. *Knowledge of Leaders* is a cumulative index counting whether respondents know enough about the president, their MP, regional government officials, and local government officials to make a judgment on their performance. The summary variable counts the number of leaders that respondents 'know', and thus ranges from 0 to 4.

Cognitive awareness is also measured by respondents' *Education*, *Cognitive Engagement*, and *Awareness of Democracy*. *Cognitive Engagement* is an average of two indicators asking respondents how interested they are in political affairs and how often they discuss politics.³⁶ The variable *Aware of Democracy* is measured with a dummy variable distinguishing whether respondents can judge how democratic their country is or if they do not understand the concept of democracy.

Respondents' age and political generation control for structural factors related to public opinion. Political generation variables are calculated by considering whether the respondent turned 18 during the colonial, post-colonial, or multi-party era in their country's history. Dummy variables for *Post-Colonial Generation* and *Multi-Party Generation* are included in the model; those respondents who came of age in the colonial era are treated as the reference category.

Cultural values are measured with variables tapping respondents' tolerance for risk and their trust of others. *Risk Tolerance* is measured by assessing whether respondents believe that people should be responsible for their well-being or if the government should ensure the well-being of all citizens.³⁷ *Interpersonal Trust* is measured by asking respondents how much they trust average shopkeepers, with high values indicating higher levels of trust.³⁸ Finally, institutional

influences are measured with two indicators of associational life. *Member of Religious Group* is a dummy variable distinguishing all self-reported members, and *Member of Other Associations* is an additive index reflecting whether a respondent is a member of a community development group, business group, or labour union.

Results

The analysis begins by testing whether citizens define democracy using the same criteria as contemporary democratic theorists. If citizens do conceptualize democracy in both procedural and substantive terms, it also provides empirical validation to the theoretical critique of the existing literature – that the findings rely on a woefully incomplete conceptualization of the democratization process.

This is done by examining whether citizens who believe the regime exhibits higher levels of *Responsive* and *Enforcement Capacity* also judge their country as more democratic, measured as their assessment of the *Extent of Democracy*. A positive relationship between these variables will suggest that citizens do indeed judge democracy according to substantive reforms. Table 1 reports the results of ordered logistic regressions testing this hypothesis. Traditional least squares regression is ill-suited to the estimation of dependent variables that are not continuous, particularly for categorical variables where the interval between adjacent categories may not be equal.³⁹ Ordered logistic regression techniques correct for these shortcomings, and are presented in Panel A. Note that each regression also includes a set of country dummy variables as regressors, although their estimates are not reported. In all three regressions, the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant.

The coefficients of ordered logistic regressions, unlike ordinary least squares (OLS), are not directly interpretable in terms of the magnitude of the effects. Describing the substantive impact of the variables requires using the regression estimates to calculate the discrete changes in predicted probabilities associated with each category of the dependent variable. In other words, the information from the regression estimates is used to evaluate the change in the likelihood of each response, given a hypothetical shift in the values of the relevant independent variable. This process has become a standard method of interpreting the magnitude of effects in categorical dependent variable regression models.⁴⁰

Panel B of Table 1 reports these changes in predicted probabilities. For instance, the cell on the upper left side of Panel B has the value -0.051 . This value is interpreted as the change in the probability of a respondent saying their country is 'Not a democracy' if the relevant independent variable (*Responsive Capacity*) shifts from the minimum to the maximum value. In other words, a shift from the lowest level of perceived substantive democratization to the highest level leads to a 5% reduction in the probability that a respondent believes their regime is not democratic. The same hypothetical shift in the value of *Responsive Capacity* is associated with a nearly 14% (0.137) increase in the probability that a respondent believes their regime is a 'Full Democracy'. Greater levels of

Table 1. Relationship between democratization indicators and the extent of democracy.

Panel A: Ordered logistic regression estimates

	Dependent variable = Extent of democracy		
	1	2	3
Responsive capacity	0.313** (0.018)	—	—
Enforcement capacity	—	0.560** (0.016)	—
Delivery of political rights	—	—	0.778** (0.020)
<i>Estimated cut points</i>	1 = -1.095 2 = 1.159 3 = 3.280	1 = -0.660 2 = 2.322 3 = 4.513	1 = 0.945 2 = 3.331 3 = 5.519
N	20,426	19,310	19,803
-2 ln L	-23,997.3	-22,092.5	-22,620.6
LR Chi-square	2175.2	3012.3	3469.6
P	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001

Panel B: Discrete changes in predicted probabilities, using above estimates.

Independent variables run their range from minimum to maximum values.

	Not a democracy	Democracy with major problems	Democracy with minor problems	Full democracy
Responsive capacity	-0.051	-0.162	0.077	0.137
Enforcement capacity	-0.158	0.345	0.243	0.260
Delivery of political rights	-0.330	-0.317	0.367	0.279

Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses;

**=significant at 1%; separate country intercepts also estimated but not reported

Values indicate the change in the predicted probability of a respondent providing this assessment of the 'extent of democracy' when the independent variable changes from the minimum to the maximum observed value.

perceived substantive democratization increase the likelihood that respondents judge the regime to be democratic.

An identical pattern emerges for the other indicator of substantive democratization, *Enforcement Capacity*. Shifts from the minimum to maximum values are associated with a 16% reduction in the probability that citizens believe their regime is 'Not a Democracy' and a 26% increase in the probability that they believe their regime is a 'Full Democracy'. Moreover, at least in terms of *Enforcement Capacity*, the effects on the perceived level of democracy are as large as the more traditional procedural elements measured by *Delivery of Political Rights*. In short, citizens in Africa's liberalizing regime do indeed judge democracy according to procedural and substantive elements.

These results suggest that the omission of substantive democratization from the suite of items citizens use to form legitimacy attitudes has serious consequences. Popular learning models, if they are to accurately describe how citizens learn about democracy, must also include evaluations of substantive democratization when predicting legitimacy attitudes.

To this end, Table 2 presents the results of a regression model which tests whether substantive democratization creates more committed democrats. The dependent variable is the construct *Demand for Democracy*, consisting of support for the principle of democracy and rejection of authoritarian alternatives. As noted above, this construct is the average of four separate indicators and results in a variable that is approximately continuous. Given this dependent variable, the analysis uses OLS regression. While not reported in the table, the model also includes separate country intercepts to control for country-specific effects.

Focusing specifically on the procedural and substantive democratization indicators, a surprising pattern emerges. While *Delivery of Political Rights* has the expected positive and highly significant coefficient, the coefficients for the variables *Enforcement Capacity* and *Responsive Capacity* are highly significant but negative. This suggests that citizens who believe the regime has been more

Table 2. The effect of democratization indicators on democratic commitment.

Dependent variable: demand for democracy			
	B	S.E.	Beta
<i>Procedural democratization</i>			
Delivery of political rights	0.106**	0.008	0.119
<i>Substantive democratization</i>			
Responsive capacity	−0.042**	0.007	−0.049
Enforcement capacity	−0.043**	0.007	−0.060
<i>Controls</i>			
See democracy as procedures	0.165**	0.014	0.094
Knowledge of leaders	−0.039**	0.008	−0.043
Aware of democracy	0.203**	0.023	0.074
Cognitive engagement	0.067**	0.005	0.112
Education	0.060**	0.003	0.178
Post-colonial generation	0.066**	0.021	0.047
Multiparty generation	0.089**	0.024	0.053
Age of respondent	0.004**	0.000	0.087
Risk tolerance	0.002	0.003	0.004
Interpersonal trust	0.020	0.011	0.015
Member of religious group	0.030*	0.014	0.018
Member of other associations	−0.016**	0.006	−0.021
Constant	1.540**	0.060	—

Observations 13940

R-squared 0.16

* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01

Separate country intercepts also estimated but not reported.

successful at substantive democratization are actually less likely to demand democracy. In other words, substantive democratization fosters citizens who are *less* committed to democracy.⁴¹ Although citizens view democratization in both procedural and substantive terms, the individual effects on legitimacy attitudes are in opposite directions. The standardized *beta* coefficients suggest that the negative effects are about half the magnitude of procedural democratization. Nevertheless, substantive democratization is not associated with more committed democrats, and instead actually reduces support for the principle of democracy.⁴²

Moreover, this negative effect is significant even after controlling for other factors that may affect legitimacy attitudes. For instance, the results control for general cognitive engagement with politics and include a dummy variable for those citizens who are unaware of the concept of democracy. Even when controlling for education, age, and prominent cultural and structural factors, those citizens who believe the new regime is more successful with substantive democratization are less likely to be committed democrats. Finally, this result holds when controlling for citizens' perceptions of the extent of democracy. In several robustness analyses, the models controlled for whether citizens viewed the regime as democratic or not a democracy, by including the variable *Extent of Democracy*. In these specifications, both substantive democratization indicators retained their negative and significant coefficients, and the *betas* were roughly equivalent in magnitude to the results in Table 2.⁴³

The variables measuring respondents' cognitive awareness all have positive and highly significant estimated coefficients, suggesting that much of the explanatory power in the model is related to the role of these cognitive factors. There are also social structure and institutional influences shaping *Demand for Democracy*. Respondents who came of age in the post-colonial or multiparty eras are far more likely to demand democracy than their fellow citizens who lived during the colonial era. Associational effects are mixed. Religious group membership has a positive effect on demand for democracy, although most respondents (nearly 70%) claim to belong to a religious group. Additional associational membership is much more limited, with over half of all respondents having no additional group affiliation. This effect is negative, and is likely a better estimate of the effect of institutional influences on demand for democracy.

These findings are surprising given the conventional wisdom surrounding popular learning models. The conclusion that increases in substantive democratization actually reduce citizen commitment to democracy runs counter to the expectations of popular learning models based on evaluations of procedural democratization. These findings also present a practical challenge for new democracies; as they become more capable of enforcing the rule of law and more responsive to citizen demands, mass publics become less secure in their support for the democratic regime. This counter-intuitive result demands further exploration.

As a first attempt at unravelling these surprising results, Table 3 examines the relationship between substantive democratization and the individual indicators used to create the composite *Demand for Democracy*. As noted above, this

Table 3. Ordered logistic regression estimates of the relationship between substantive democratization and components of *Demand for democracy*.

Panel A: DV = Support democracy			Panel B: DV = Reject one party rule		
	1	2		1	2
Responsive capacity	0.104** (0.018)	–	Responsive capacity	–0.791** (0.016)	–
Enforcement capacity	–	0.265** (0.017)	Enforcement capacity	–	–0.115** (0.014)
<i>Estimated cut points</i>	1 = –1.694	1 = –1.021	<i>Estimated cut points</i>	1 = –2.779	1 = –2.977
	2 = –0.446	2 = 0.134		2 = –1.569	2 = –1.787
				3 = –1.194	3 = –1.425
				4 = 0.089	4 = –0.120
N	22,939	21,280	N	22,949	21,293
–2 ln L	–19,672.4	–17,699.8	–2 ln L	–32,316.7	–29,718.3
LR Chi-square	821.7	973.3	LR Chi-square	909.64	900.6
P	<0.001	<0.001	P	<0.001	<0.001
Panel C: DV = Reject military rule			Panel D: DV = Reject one man rule		
	1	2		1	2
Responsive capacity	–0.032 (0.017)	–	Responsive capacity	–0.044** (0.017)	–
Enforcement capacity	–	0.054** (0.015)	Enforcement capacity	–	–0.055** (0.015)
<i>Estimated cut points</i>	1 = –2.868	1 = –2.619	<i>Estimated cut points</i>	1 = –3.197	1 = –3.266
	2 = –1.597	2 = –1.352		2 = –1.876	2 = –1.938
	3 = –0.892	3 = –0.694		3 = –1.00	3 = –1.105
	4 = 0.479	4 = 0.700		4 = 0.426	4 = 0.340
N	22,944	21,289	N	22,948	21,294
–2 ln L	–27,571.6	–25,472.5	–2 ln L	–27,760.2	–25,648.3
LR Chi-square	2229.7	2116.1	LR Chi-square	2355.6	2209.5
P	<0.001	<0.001	P	<0.001	<0.001

Unstandardized coefficients reported with standard errors in parentheses;
**=significant at 1%; separate country intercepts also estimated but not reported.

construct measures respondents’ support for the principle of democracy as well as their rejection of several prominent forms of non-democratic rule, including one-party rule, military rule, and one-man rule. Although the literature widely employs this composite indicator, it is possible that substantive democratization shapes these different components in separate ways. Table 3 presents a series of regressions that evaluate the effect of substantive democratization on each component separately. Each panel uses a different component as the dependent variable, although all are categorical variables with higher values indicating pro-democratic attitudes.⁴⁴ Once again, the analysis uses ordered logistic regression and separate country dummy variables are included but not reported in the table of results.

Although the estimated coefficients do not describe the magnitude of the effects, it is clear that substantive democratization shapes the constituent parts of *Demand for Democracy* in distinct manners. Specifically, the estimated coefficients in Panel A are both positive and significant, while most of the estimated coefficients in Panels B, C, and D are negative and significant. This suggests that citizens who believe the regime is responsive and enforces the rule of law continue to express their support for the concept of democratic governance, but are less likely to reject authoritarian alternatives to government.

Table 4 uses these ordered logistic estimates to describe the relevant changes in predicted probabilities. The interpretation of individual cell values is analogous to Panel B of Table 1 above. Each cell indicates the discrete change in the predicted probability of the specified dependent variable response when the value of the independent variable changes. For instance, as *Enforcement Capacity* shifts from the minimum to the maximum observed value, a respondent becomes nearly 13% (-0.127) less likely to 'Prefer non-Democracy' and over 23% (0.233) more likely to 'Prefer Democracy.'

However, similar shifts in *Enforcement* and *Responsive Capacity* have measurable negative effects on respondents' rejection of authoritarianism. Increases in *Enforcement Capacity* from the minimum to maximum values, for instance, lead to an 11% (-0.109) decrease in the probability that a respondent 'Strongly Disapproves of One Party Rule' and a 6% (-0.055) decrease of 'Strongly Disapproving of One Man Rule'. Similar patterns emerge for the remaining relationships. In five of the six possible specifications, substantive democratization has a measurably negative effect on respondents' rejection of authoritarian alternatives.

There is one important caveat to these findings. Specifically, note that while increases in substantive democratization lead to citizens moderating their disapproval of authoritarianism, they have much a smaller impact on encouraging approval of authoritarianism. For instance, in the panel where the dependent variable is *Reject One Party Rule*, the hypothetical increase in *Enforcement Capacity* leads to an 11% reduction in the probability of strong disapproval, but only a 4% increase in the probability of strong approval. This pattern is present throughout most of the analyses and suggests that success at substantive democratization does not turn citizens into autocrats, but critically reduces their rejection of these non-democratic alternatives. In short, substantive democratization creates citizens who are more accepting of authoritarian forms of government. These are sobering findings, for they indicate that mass publics are willing to sacrifice democracy for the provision of a responsive, stable, and secure environment.

While not originally anticipated, these results have some basis in existing theory. Rose and Shin, for instance, have described the political transitions of the Third Wave as 'democratization backwards', where mass elections and universal suffrage preceded the institutionalization of a modern state.⁴⁵ This historically backwards sequence is especially common among African democracies. Consequently, citizens have developed attitudes toward democracy in the context of weak, incomplete democracies whose substantive reforms cannot match the

Table 4. Discrete changes in predicted probabilities, using estimates from Table 3.

DV = Support democracy					
	Prefer non-democracy	Doesn't matter/ Don't know	Prefer democracy		
Responsive capacity	−0.033	−0.035	0.068		
Enforcement capacity	−0.127	−0.106	0.233		
DV = Reject one party rule					
	Strongly approve of one party rule	Approve of one party rule	Neutral	Disapprove of one party rule	Strongly disapprove of one party rule
Responsive capacity	0.02	0.025	0.008	0.003	−0.055
Enforcement capacity	0.035	0.046	0.015	0.013	−0.109
DV = Reject military rule					
	Strongly approve of military rule	Approve of military rule	Neutral	Disapprove of military rule	Strongly disapprove of military rule
Responsive capacity	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.009	−0.024
Enforcement capacity	−0.007	−0.014	−0.013	−0.020	0.054
DV = Reject one man rule					
	Strongly approve of one man rule	Approve of one man rule	Neutral	Disapprove of one man rule	Strongly disapprove of one man rule
Responsive capacity	0.004	0.008	0.010	0.011	−0.033
Enforcement capacity	0.006	0.013	0.016	0.021	−0.055

Values indicate the change in the predicted probability of a respondent's answer choice when the independent variable changes from the minimum to the maximum value.

scope and pace of procedural democratization. Given this history, it is no surprise that citizens would become more accepting of authoritarian rule if it would lead to enhanced responsiveness, security, and rule of law.

Ultimately, reversing the effect of substantive democratization on democratic commitment depends on supply-side reform. African regimes must demonstrate

that responsiveness, security, and the rule of law are best provided by liberal democracies. New regimes must make democracy and security appear less mutually exclusive in the minds of most citizens.

Conclusions and implications

Recent work has argued that legitimacy attitudes develop as citizens learn about democracy and evaluate its performance, yet these conclusions are based on evaluations of procedural democracy only. Democratization is a process consisting of both procedural and substantive reforms. This conception of democratization is fully integrated into the theoretical literature but has been virtually ignored in the survey literature that actually analyses the correlates of democratic commitment.

This paper has analysed two important questions previously unexplored. First, do citizens in Africa's transitional regimes view democratization in procedural and substantive terms? And if so, how does perceived substantive democratization affect legitimacy attitudes? Analysis of recent public opinion data illustrates both expected and unexpected findings. On the first question, the results clearly indicated that citizens do indeed include procedural and substantive reforms as part of the democratization process. Citizens who believe the regime has delivered more political rights and civil liberties, is more responsive to citizen demands, and upholds the rule of law, judge their country as more democratic.

Unexpectedly, however, these evaluations of substantive democratization have a negative effect on overall legitimacy attitudes. Citizens who offer positive evaluations of substantive democratization are less likely to be committed democrats. Further analysis revealed that these findings are driven by a significant negative association between substantive democratization and rejection of authoritarian alternatives. When transitional regimes become more responsive and capable of enforcing the rule of law, citizens are more accepting of authoritarian rule. Given the history of weak states and incomplete democracies in Africa, citizens appear to value a strong state over democratic governance.

These findings have several implications for the continued study of mass attitudes toward democracy. Principally, the findings suggest that measuring the complete democratization process considerably modifies the conclusions of the existing literature. Citizens do form legitimacy attitudes by learning about all aspects of the democratization process. The impacts of various evaluations, however, differ. While the findings above explained this in terms of a history of 'democratization backwards', future research might seek to explore why substantive democratization is associated with less commitment to democracy.

These results also serve as an important reminder of an integral but often neglected caveat to popular learning models: the regimes that citizens learn about are incomplete, hybrid democracies at best. Citizens are not evaluating the performance of an ideal-type democracy or even a polyarchy in Dahl's conception.⁴⁶ Mass publics in Africa experience a variant of democracy that is considerably diluted compared to the established regimes from prior waves of democracy.

Unless citizens can clearly identify their regime for what it is – an incomplete democracy somewhere between authoritarian rule and liberal democracy – the learning process is likely to have further unanticipated consequences.

This realization may also foreshadow a general downward reorientation of citizens' attitudes toward democracy. Citizens are likely to have started the transition process as especially supportive of democracy, given the tendency of African democratization movements to involve significant public protest and support for fundamental political changes. In the years that follow, however, these same citizens may realize that the process has not resulted in the foundation of a regime with clearly liberal characteristics. Attitudes toward democracy – especially citizens' commitment to democratic rule – could revert back to lower levels in the following years.⁴⁷ While the analysis here does not directly address this hypothesis, the recent addition of across-time survey data in Afrobarometer countries makes this an intriguing possibility for future research.

Finally, the results demonstrate that the continued liberalization of democracies in Africa is *not* enough to ensure that democracy becomes 'the only game in town'. Instead, liberalizing regimes are caught in a dangerous paradox. On the one hand, failure to supplement procedural reforms with substantive democratization will likely hasten the 'hollowing out'⁴⁸ of democracy until Third Wave democracies share more in common with authoritarian regimes than with established democracies. But on the other hand, regimes that are more successful at substantive democratization appear to be associated with increasing numbers of citizens less committed to democratic governance. It would appear that increases in governmental responsiveness and the rule of law encourage citizens to be more accepting of their 'imperfectly democratic' regime. These findings are sobering reminders that citizens in new democracies may well have failed to connect the principle of democracy with the security and state responsiveness they desire. If the longevity of democratic governance depends on mass attitudes of democratic legitimacy, African democracies must work to ensure that responsiveness, security, and the rule of law can be delivered by their often 'imperfect' democratic systems.

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Notes

1. di Palma, *To Craft Democracies*. On legitimacy attitudes' effect on democratic stability, see Diamond, *Developing Democracy*; Lipset, *Political Man*.
2. Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion*; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, *Democracy and its Alternatives*; Mishler and Rose, 'Generation, Age, and Time'.
3. Lipset, *Political Man*, 64.
4. Shin, 'Democratization'.
5. e.g. Diamond, *Developing Democracy*; Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion*. On advanced democracies, see Norris, *Critical Citizens* and Dalton, *Democratic Challenges*, 199–200.

6. Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion*, 44.
7. Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Easton, 'Re-Assessment'; Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*.
8. Mishler and Rose, 'Learning and Re-Learning', 7.
9. Ibid., 8.
10. Mishler and Rose, 'Political Support'; Mishler and Rose, 'Generation, Age, and Time'.
11. Mishler and Rose, 'Generation, Age, and Time', 823.
12. Mishler and Rose, 'Generation, Age, and Time'; Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion*.
13. See for instance, Anderson and Guillory, 'Political Institutions'; Lagos, 'Between Stability and Crisis'; Diamond, *Developing Democracy*; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*; Evans and Whitefield, 'Politics and Economics'.
14. Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, *Democracy and its Alternatives*.
15. Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion*.
16. Mattes and Bratton, 'Learning about Democracy'.
17. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 271.
18. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, 175; Shin, *Mass Politics and Culture*, 18.
19. Shin and Lee, 'Democratization and its Consequences', 76.
20. Bratton and Chang, 'State Building and Democratization'.
21. Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 18; See also Sklar, 'Developmental Democracy'.
22. Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, *Democracy and its Alternatives*, 31–6.
23. Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion*, 68.
24. Rose and Shin, 'Democratizing Backwards'.
25. Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*.
26. van de Walle, *African Economies*, 243.
27. Ukiwo, 'Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts'; Bratton and Lewis, 'Durability of Political Goods'; Diamond, 'Nigeria', 390.
28. Detailed information on the survey methodology, as well as survey results, can be found at www.afrobarometer.org and in Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion*. The surveyed countries are Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Cape Verde, Kenya, Mozambique, and Senegal. Respondents from Zimbabwe are omitted in the following analyses because of data availability.
29. Mattes and Bratton, 'Learning about Democracy', 200 (Table 1).
30. All four variables are sufficiently correlated to warrant the construction of a multi-item index. Principal Components Analysis extracts a single factor that explains nearly half of the common variance. Cronbach's alpha is 0.55.
31. Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives*.
32. Principal Components Analysis extracts a factor that explains over 60% of the common variance; Cronbach's alpha value is 0.79.
33. Bratton and Chang, 'State Building and Democratization'.
34. Principal Components Analysis extracts a factor that explains nearly two-thirds of the common variance. Cronbach's alpha measure of reliability is relatively low (0.50), but not unexpected given that only two indicators are used to create the variable.
35. Principal Components Analysis extracts a factor that explains nearly 90% of the common variance. Cronbach's alpha value is very high (0.88).
36. These variables are sufficiently correlated to warrant the construction of an average index. Cronbach's alpha is 0.5.
37. Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion*, originally measured this concept by assessing whether citizens were willing to invest their own money in a business, even though it may fail. The construction used here differs, since the second round

- of Afrobarometer data lacks the same survey indicator. The measurement employed in this analysis taps the same underlying notion of whether citizens are willing to risk their economic survival on their own hard work.
38. The second round of Afrobarometer surveys lacks the standard interpersonal trust indicator. I have used this particular proxy measure because alternative indicators in the survey assess trust for political figures, which may be less consistent with more general interpersonal trust levels.
 39. For more detailed discussion of these issues, see Long, *Regression Models* and Kennedy, *Guide to Econometrics*.
 40. Long, *Regression Models*, 135–146.
 41. Standard diagnostics indicate that there are no substantial collinearity problems in the model; highest VIF statistic is 3.5.
 42. Even within the literature using the Afrobarometer, there are various ways of measuring citizens' *Demand for Democracy*. For instance, Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, *Public Opinion*, 181, describe the construction of an ordinal variable dividing respondents into three categories: uncommitted democrats, partially committed democrats, and fully committed democrats. In a robustness analysis, I have used this ordinal measurement and the appropriate ordered logistic regression techniques to test the effect of substantive democratization. The results of this exercise are very similar to the OLS results presented here, including the positive effect of procedural democratization on democratic commitment and the negative effect of substantive democratization. These results are available in Appendix B.
 43. These results are available in Appendix B.
 44. The coding of these individual variables is discussed in Appendix A.
 45. Rose and Shin, 'Democratization Backwards'. For a similar argument on the near-universal acceptance of procedural democratization, see Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization'.
 46. Dahl, *Polyarchy*.
 47. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.
 48. Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 19.

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Appendix A: Variables, item wording, and summary statistics

This appendix lists the names of all variables employed in the analysis, describes how they were constructed (if not simply a single survey item), and provides summary statistics. All survey items are taken from the Afrobarometer Round II Merged Codebook, available from www.afrobarometer.org. Unless otherwise noted, the variables are coded to retain all answer choices available to the respondent. Where variables are indices constructed from multiple items, more specific information, including the relevant citation is given.

Variable	Item code	Item wording	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<i>Extent of democracy</i>	Q37	In your opinion, how much of a democracy is your country today? 1 = Not a democracy 2 = A democracy with major problems 3 = A democracy with minor problems 4 = A full democracy	21,300	2.68	0.84	1	4
<i>Demand for democracy</i>		This variable is the average of the following survey items. See Mattes and Bratton, 'Learning about Democracy', 200.	24,200	2.61	0.71	0	3.5
	Q38	Which of these statements is closest to your own opinion? A: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. B: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. C: For someone like me, it doesn't matter whatkind of government we have.					
	Q35A	Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office.					
	Q35C	Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? The army comes in to govern the country.					
	Q35D	Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything.					

(Continued)

Appendix A. Continued.

Variable	Item code	Item wording	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<i>Delivery of political rights</i>		This variable is an average of the following four items. See Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi <i>Public Opinion</i> , 384.	21,967	3.76	0.79	1	5
	Q36A	Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same: Freedom to say what you think?					
	Q36B	Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same: Freedom to join any political organization you want?					
	Q36D	Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same: Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured?					
	Q36G	Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same: Equal and fair treatment for all people by the government?					
<i>Responsive capacity</i>		This variable is an average of the following two items. See Bratton and Chang, 'State Building and Democratization'.	22,957	1.88	0.82	1	4
	Q50A	How much of the time do you think elected leaders, like parliamentarians or local councillors, try their best: To look after the interests of people like you?					
	Q50B	How much of the time do you think elected leaders, like parliamentarians or local councillors, try their best: To listen to what people like you have to say?					
<i>Enforcement capacity</i>		This variable is an average of the following two Items. See Bratton and Chang, 'State Building and Democratization'.	21,299	3.3	0.96	1	5
	Q53A	Comparing the current administration under [current president] with the previous administration under [former president], would you say that the one we have now is more or less: Able to enforce the law?					

(Continued)

Appendix A. Continued.

Variable	Item code	Item wording	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<i>Knowledge of leaders</i>	Q36F	Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they used to be, or about the same: Safety from crime and violence?					
		Additive index of the number of political leaders that the respondent is aware of. Any response is coded as 'aware' of the official in question. Don't Know is coded as 'unaware'.	18,727	3.52	0.97	0	4
	Q48A	Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past 12 months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: President					
<i>Education</i>	Q48B	Same as above: Member of Parliament					
	Q48C	Same as above: Regional government/official					
	Q48D	Same as above: Local government/official					
	Q84	What is the highest level of education you completed?	24,178	3.15	2.00	0	9
<i>Aware of democracy</i>		Coded as a dummy variable, where 0 is all respondents who 'don't know'.	24,230	0.88	0.33	0	1
<i>Cognitive engagement</i>	Q37	In your opinion, how much of a democracy is [your country] today?					
		Average of the following two indicators	23,627	3.24	1.17	1	5
	Q27	How interested are you in public affairs?					
<i>Post-colonial generation</i>	Q25A	Please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Discussed politics with friends or neighbours?					
		Both generation variables are constructed following Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi, <i>Public Opinion</i> , 167. Years of founding elections taken from Bratton and van de Walle, <i>Democratic Experiments in Africa</i> .	24,248	0.30	0.46	0	1
		Same as <i>Post-Colonial Generation</i> .	24,248	0.30	0.46	0	1
<i>Multiparty generation</i>							
<i>Age of respondent</i>	Q80	How old were you at your last birthday?	23,616	6.3	14.8	18	105

(Continued)

Appendix A. Continued.

864

Variable	Item code	Item wording	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<i>Member of religious group</i>		Coded as a dummy variable to distinguish members versus non-members.	23,079	0.75	0.43	0	1
	Q24A	For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: A religious group (e.g. church, mosque)?					
<i>Member of other associations</i>		This variable is an additive index of three dummy variables.	22,542	0.61	0.88	0	3
	Q24C	For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: A professional or business association?					
	Q24D	For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: A community development or self-help association?					
<i>See democracy as procedures</i>	Q24B	For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member: A trade union or farmers association/club/cooperative?					
		This variable is a dummy variable distinguishing whether respondents agree with statement A.	24,232	0.80	0.40	0	1
	Q30	Which of the following statements is closest to your view? A) We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open, and honest elections. B) Since elections sometimes produce bad results, we should adopt other methods for choosing this country's leaders.					
<i>Risk tolerance</i>	Q61	Which of the following statements is closest to your view? A) People should look after themselves and be responsible for their own success in life. B) The government should bear the main responsibility for the well-being of people.	23,997	2.93	1.59	1	5
<i>Interpersonal trust</i>	Q43Q	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Small businesses/shopkeeper?	21,202	1.91	0.54	1	3

M.D. Fails

Appendix B: Robustness and sensitivity analysis for ‘Does substantive democratization create more committed democrats? Surprising evidence from Africa’.

Results from endnote #42 in the article

Table 2a. Testing the effect of democratization on democratic commitment.

Ordered Logistic Regression		
Dependent variable: <i>Commitment to democracy</i> ordinal variable		
	Unstandardized coefficient	Standard error
<i>Procedural democratization</i>		
Delivery of political rights	0.105**	(0.026)
<i>Substantive democratization</i>		
Responsive capacity	−0.016	(0.023)
Enforcement capacity	−0.084**	(0.022)
<i>Controls</i>		
See democracy as procedures	−0.349**	(0.044)
Knowledge of leaders	−0.029	(0.024)
Aware of democracy	0.780**	(0.074)
Cognitive engagement	0.197**	(0.016)
Education	0.160**	(0.010)
Post-colonial generation	0.122	(0.065)
Multiparty generation	0.166*	(0.075)
Age of respondent	0.008**	(0.002)
Risk tolerance	0.002	(0.011)
Interpersonal trust	−0.020	(0.034)
Member of religious group	−0.054	(0.043)
Member of other associations	0.015	(0.019)
<i>Estimated cut points</i>	1 = 1.23	
	2 = 4.11	
N	13,970	
−2 ln L	−12,725.6	
LR Chi-square	1286.02	
p	<0.001	

* = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%.

Separate country intercepts also estimated but not reported.

Results from endnote #42, cont.

Table 2b. Discrete changes in predicted probabilities, using estimates from Table 2a.

	Uncommitted democrats	Partially committed democrats	Fully committed democrats
Delivery of political rights	−0.067	0.003	0.064
Responsive capacity	0.009	−0.002	−.006
Enforcement capacity	0.059	−0.014	−0.046

Independent variables run their range from minimum to maximum values.

Results from endnote #43 in the article

Table 2c. The effect of democratization indicators on democratic commitment. Controlling for *Extent of Democracy*; OLS Regression.

Dependent variable: Demand for democracy			
	B	S.E.	Beta
<i>Procedural democratization</i>			
Delivery of political rights	0.110**	0.008	0.124
<i>Substantive democratization</i>			
Responsive capacity	−0.039**	0.007	−0.047
Enforcement capacity	−0.039**	0.007	−0.055
<i>Controls</i>			
Extent of democracy	−0.020**	0.005	−0.037
See democracy as procedures	0.169**	0.014	0.096
Knowledge of leaders	−0.039**	0.008	−0.043
Aware of democracy	0.203**	0.031	0.053
Cognitive engagement	0.069**	0.005	0.115
Education	0.060**	0.003	0.176
Post-colonial generation	0.069**	0.021	0.048
Multiparty generation	0.093**	0.024	0.055
Age of respondent	0.004**	0.001	0.088
Risk tolerance	0.002	0.003	0.004
Interpersonal trust	0.025*	0.011	0.019
Member of religious group	0.030*	0.013	0.018
Member of other associations	−0.016**	0.006	−0.022
Constant	1.538	0.064	—

Observations 13,460.
R-squared 0.16.
* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01.
Separate country intercepts also estimated but not reported.